|Typ der Publikation||Book|
|Untertitel / Serientitel||Testimony before the United States Senate Armed Services Committee|
|Anzahl Seiten||18 pp.|
|Verlag||Center on International Cooperation|
The United States missed an opportunity to stabilize Afghanistan and isolate al-Qaida and the Taliban after the tactical military victory in 2001-2002. The failure to invest adequately in either security or reconstruction and the diversion of US political, intelligence, military, and financial resources to Iraq left the Afghan government unable to satisfy popular expectations for security and development. This neglect led neighboring countries to conclude that the US was not serious about success in Afghanistan but gave priority to other objectives. Hence they hedged their bets by continuing to support their clients in Afghanistan.The administration\'s fixation on Iraq and Iran led it to neglect the development of greater threats to the US and the world within Pakistan, which the administration is addressing only belatedly and with half-measures. As a result, the US and NATO now have more military forces in Afghanistan than ever before, expenditure on assistance to Afghanistan is higher than ever before, and yet both the Afghan government and the international forces supporting it are in a less advantageous position than at any time since the overthrow of the Taliban.With the Taliban resurgent, reconstruction faltering, and opium poppy cultivation at an all-time high, Afghanistan is at risk of collapsing into chaos. If Washington wants to save the international effort there, it must increase its commitment to the area and rethink its strategy - especially its approach to Pakistan, which continues to give sanctuary to insurgents on its tribal frontier.